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BLACK CITIZENSHIP, DEHUMANIZATION, AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Reginald Oh∗ 
The fight for full Black citizenship has been in large measure a fight 
against the systematic dehumanization of African Americans. 
Dehumanization is the process of treating people as less than human, as 
subhuman. Denying Blacks full and equal citizenship has gone hand in 
hand with denying their full humanity. To effectively promote equal 
citizenship for African Americans, therefore, requires an explicit 
commitment to ending their dehumanization. 
In this Essay, Part I will discuss the concept of dehumanization and 
its role in the infliction of harm on a dehumanized class of people. Part II 
will discuss the concept of citizenship, and contend that full and equal 
citizenship consists of four layers of citizenship: formal, political, civil, 
and social citizenship. While the first three types of citizenship are 
familiar, social citizenship is a neglected yet crucial aspect of full 
citizenship. Social citizenship entails the right and ability to enter into and 
have personal relationships based on mutual respect and equality with 
other members or citizens of the political community. 
Part III will examine three key race and citizenship cases to illustrate 
how dehumanization has been pivotal in denying full citizenship or 
imposing second-class citizenship on Blacks, especially in denying 
Blacks social citizenship. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court 
dehumanized Blacks to deny them formal U.S. citizenship.1 In Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the Court dehumanized Blacks in upholding racial segregation 
and denying them social citizenship.2 In Naim v. Naim, the Virginia 
Supreme Court dehumanized racial minorities in upholding a ban on 
∗ Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. Part I of this 
Essay was previously published in the California Western Law Review. Reginald Oh, 
Dehumanization, Immigrants, and Equal Protection, 56 CAL. W. L. REV. 103 (2019).  
1. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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interracial marriage, contending that interracial marriages would 
undermine good citizenship.3 
Part IV will conclude by exploring the implications of my analysis 
for Black citizenship in the twenty-first century. It’s only when 
dehumanization is squarely addressed and eliminated that full and equal 
citizenship status can realistically be attained. A constitutional doctrine of 
equal citizenship, then, must address and eliminate practices and policies 
which systematically dehumanize African Americans, such as racial 
segregation in education or racist policing. 
I. DEHUMANIZATION 
Dehumanization is the process by which people are understood to be 
less than human.4 A group or class of people is dehumanized through 
language or imagery depicting them as animalistic or subhuman. 
Dehumanization encompasses two layers. One layer involves stripping a 
person, or class of persons, of human qualities, such as emotions and 
cognitive abilities.5 The second layer involves “attributing demonic or 
bestial qualities to them.”6 The two layers combine to turn a dehumanized 
person into something less than human, something even akin to a 
subhuman, animalistic creature.7 
For social psychologist Albert Bandura, “[t]he process of 
dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the perpetration of 
inhumanities.”8 Dehumanization plays a paramount role in the 
marginalization of certain groups, as “conceiving of people as subhuman 
often makes them objects of violence and victims of degradation.”9 
How does dehumanization lead people to inflict harm or support 
punitive policies against a class of people? One factor is the attitudes of 
the person or group engaging in dehumanization. When a group views a 
specific class of people as subhuman, these outgroups are placed “outside 
of normal moral consideration,” which then “facilitate[s] violence against 
the dehumanized group.”10 According to Herbert Kelman, “[t]o the extent 
3. 197 Va. 80 (1955). 
4. DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND 
EXTERMINATE OTHERS 26 (2011). 
5. See Nour Kteily et al., The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant 
Dehumanization, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 3–4 (2015). 
6. Albert Bandura, Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency, 31 J. 
MORAL EDUC. 101, 109 (2002). 
7. Kteily et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
8. Bandura, supra note 6, at 200. 
9. SMITH, supra note 4, at 37. 
10. Kteily et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
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victims are dehumanized, principles of morality no longer apply to them 
and moral restraints are more readily overcome.”11 The ability to restrain 
oneself from engaging in cruel conduct against another person is severely 
diminished once the victim is stripped of human qualities.12 
Dehumanizing a group also elicits negative emotions, such as anger, 
disgust, and fear against the dehumanized group.13 Those negative 
emotions can lead to reduced empathy for the dehumanized group and 
support the desire for harsh, punitive treatment. 
Historically, dehumanization was integral to the atrocities inflicted 
upon marginalized classes in society. For example, dehumanization 
played a crucial part in the genocidal campaign against Jews during World 
War II, and in the enslavement of persons of African descent in the United 
States. 
In Nazi Germany, those who were Jewish were dehumanized as an 
insidious, subhuman race of people who possessed the qualities of disease 
and vermin.14 Adolf Hitler believed Jewish people were an “illness 
spreading parasite, representing the danger of disease.”15 He considered 
them as a “germ, germ carrier, or agent of disease, a decomposing agent, 
fungus, or maggot.”16 He referred to Jews as “bloodsuckers, leeches, and 
poisonous parasites.”17 Joseph Goebbels, in a Nazi propaganda film he 
produced entitled The Eternal Jew, connected “Jews and filth, decay, and 
disease in every sector of cultural life.  The film’s narrator gravely states 
the ‘race of parasites’ has no feeling for the ‘purity and cleanliness’ of the 
German idea of art.”18  A campaign of genocide seemed entirely rational, 
logical, and necessary to the Nazis once Jews were dehumanized as 
vermin and disease. 
Similarly, dehumanization was at the heart of African and African 
American experiences with slavery and segregation in the United States.19 
American slaveholders justified the enslavement of Africans by 
contending that they were animalistic subhumans.20  If Africans were not 
11. H.C. Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of
Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 24, 48 (1973). 
12. Bandura, supra note 6, at 200. 
13. See Stephen M. Utych, How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes Towards Immigrants, 1 
POL. RES. Q. 19 (2017). 




18. Id. at 139. 
19. See id. at 114–23 (describing dehumanization of Africans). 
20. Id. at 117 (“Many colonists treated slaves as less than human and also explicitly stated that 
Africans were soulless animals.”). 
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really human, then enslaving them did not constitute a violation of human 
rights.  Thus, slavery apologists believed that Africans could be “tamed, 
trained and used like domestic animals. . . .”21 
Even after the abolishment of slavery, African Americans continued 
to be dehumanized. Immediately after slavery was abolished, former slave 
states enacted the Black Codes, state laws constructing a system of 
discriminatory treatment depriving African Americans of basic liberties.22 
After the Fourteenth Amendment abolished the Black Codes, former slave 
states implemented Jim Crow segregation.23 Like slavery, Jim Crow 
segregation was a manifestation of the entrenched belief that African 
Americans were racially inferior subhumans and who could not share 
spaces as equals with whites.24 
The tragic story of Ota Benga, a member of the African pygmy group 
from central Africa, illustrates the horrors of dehumanization. In the early 
twentieth century, a white American arranged for Ota Benga to move from 
Africa to the United States to become an attraction at the Bronx Zoo in 
New York.25 Ota Benga was put in a cage as if he was an animal. In fact, 
they made him share his cage with an orangutan.26 The New York Times 
reported on Ota Benga, stating, “‘[f]ew expressed audible objection to the 
sight of a human being in a cage with monkeys as companions.’”27 
The treatment of Ota Benga created an uproar among the local 
African American community. Under intense social pressure, the Bronx 
Zoo ultimately released Ota Benga from his cage. However, he remained 
at the zoo and continued to be treated as an attraction. Thousands of 
visitors came to see “the star attraction in the park, the wild man from 
Africa. They chased him about the grounds all day, howling, jeering, and 
yelling” before Ota Benga ultimately committed suicide.28 
Note that dehumanization is not the same as racism, bigotry, or 
prejudice. Dehumanization is not just antipathy, discrimination, or hatred. 
One can hate a person or a race of people without denying that person’s 
or race’s full humanity. Rather, “[d]ehumanization is racism on 
21. Id. at 119. 
22. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW: A COMMEMORATIVE 
EDITION 23 (2002).  
23. See JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW 65 
(2002) (“From the end of Reconstruction until the Supreme Court’s Plessy v. Ferguson decision in 
1896, Jim Crow spread like a pestilence.”).   
24. See id. at 64 (“But Jim Crow was a Southern phenomenon, the infrastructure white
Southerners built to preserve, insofar as humanly possible, the old master/slave system.”).  
25. SMITH, supra note 4, at 121. 
26. Id. at 122. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 123. 
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steroids.”29 The worst atrocities that we associate with racism are actually 
the result of racism intertwined with dehumanization. 
II. CITIZENSHIP
While seemingly simple and straightforward, citizenship is a difficult 
concept to pin down. Citizenship is “not a unitary concept” and is 
therefore subject to multiple meanings.30 I posit a conceptual framework 
that includes four types of citizenship. 
The first concept is formal citizenship or citizenship as legal status.31 
This type of citizenship “refers to formal or nominal membership in an 
organized political community.”32 Formal citizenship is the typical 
understanding of citizenship, and it entails meeting the legal criteria for 
being a citizen. In the United States, formal U.S. citizenship is obtained 
by meeting the constitutional requirement set forth in Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or by meeting the statutory requirements to 
become a naturalized citizen. 
If by citizenship all we mean is formal citizenship, there would not 
be much complexity in defining who or who is not a full citizen of the 
United States, and the notion of second-class citizenship would have little 
salience. Complexity exists because there are multiple conceptions of 
citizenship. 
In addition to formal citizenship, I suggest that there are three other 
types of citizenship: political, civil, and social citizenship. Borrowing 
from a conceptual framework of equality from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, I view these kinds of citizenship as substantive in 
nature.33 
Political citizenship is about democratic self-governance and 
participation. Being a political citizen means having the right to equally 
and fully participate in aspects of democratic self-governance. It includes 
the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, and the right to serve in 
political office.34 Political citizenship entails the rights and duties 
associated with the political community. 
29. DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, ON INHUMANITY: DEHUMANIZATION AND HOW TO RESIST 
IT 52 (2020). 
30. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between
Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2500 (2007). 
31. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 447, 456 (2000). 
32. Id. at 456. 
33. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997). 
34. See Jack Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1689, 1694 (2005). 
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Civil citizenship is about participation in civil society.35 Civil 
citizenship includes “equal rights to make contracts, own, lease, and 
convey property, sue and be sued, and according to some formulas, the 
right of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.”36 
Social citizenship is the most ambiguous and under-theorized type of 
citizenship, yet the concept of social citizenship is crucial to 
understanding what full citizenship means as it pertains to African 
Americans. I define social citizenship in terms of both rights and 
recognition. It involves the right to enter into and have personal 
relationships with other citizens, and it involves the recognition as an 
equal within these relationships. Relationships that implicate social 
citizenship include equal relationships among colleagues, friends, 
neighbors, classmates, relatives, and spouses. Social citizenship entails 
the rights and duties associated with what I call interpersonal society. 
Leading African American political thinkers in the first half of the 
twentieth century such as W.E.B. Dubois strongly believed that full social 
citizenship was central to full Black citizenship.  He contended that Blacks 
must gain, in addition to civil and political citizenship, social equality or 
citizenship in order to be truly free.37 Dubois defined the term “social” in 
social equality or citizenship to mean “[n]ot only . . . the intimate contacts 
of the family group and of personal companions, but also and increasingly 
. . . the whole vast complex of human relationships through which we 
carry out our cultural patterns.”38 With regards to personal intimate 
contacts “like marriage, intimate friendships and sociable gatherings, 
equality means the right to select one’s own mates and close 
companions.”39 The quintessential right associated with social citizenship 
is the right to marry. Historically, Blacks were denied social citizenship 
by being denied the right to intermarry whites. 
With the three kinds of citizenship in mind, we can then theorize 
about what it means to be a second-class citizen. I suggest that, when we 
talk about a second-class citizen, we refer to a person who possesses 
formal citizenship, but who lacks or is denied one or more of the three 
other kinds of citizenship. In the context of the United States race 
relations, second-class citizenship for African Americans post-
Reconstruction Amendments has meant, in large part, the denial of full 
social citizenship. The primary basis for that denial has been rooted in 
35. See Bosniak, supra note 31, at 476–77. 
36. Balkin, supra note 34, at 1694. 
37. THEODORE BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE: SEPARATION OR MONGRELIZATION 73 (1947). 
38. Id. at 74. 
39. Id. 
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dehumanization, and that denial has resulted in systematic racial 
segregation in all aspects of interpersonal society for African Americans. 
III. THE CASES ON RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
This Section will discuss three cases on race and citizenship, and 
examine how, in each case, the court either denied formal citizenship 
entirely to, or imposed second-class citizenship status on, African 
Americans and other racial minorities. In each of the cases, the overt 
dehumanization of African Americans was at the heart and center of the 
courts’ reasoning. 
A. Dred Scott v. Sandford 
The dehumanization of African Americans was the central theme in 
the infamous 1857 Supreme Court decision denying U.S. citizenship to 
descendants of African slaves in the United States, Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.40 In Dred Scott, the Court held that, a slave and all descendants 
of slaves were categorically prohibited from being U.S. citizens, even if 
they were born on U.S. soil, even if they were themselves never a slave. 
As a result, the plaintiff, a slave seeking emancipation, could not bring a 
lawsuit in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
In short, Dred Scott rendered all descendants of slaves in the United States 
stateless non-citizens for all perpetuity. 
The key rationale was based on Chief Justice Taney’s understanding 
of the framer’s original intent regarding the status of African slaves. The 
key question was whether the framers, in constructing the Constitution 
and notions of U.S. citizenship, meant to include slaves or the descendants 
of slaves as part of the American political community and thereby entitled 
to citizenship.41 His answer was an emphatic no: 
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and 
the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither 
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their 
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then 
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the 
general words used in that memorable instrument.42 
For Taney, the reason why the framers excluded Africans from the 
American political community was because they explicitly and openly 
40. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
41. Id. at 406. 
42. Id. at 407. 
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viewed African slaves as nothing more than “ordinary articles of 
merchandise.”43 In other words, because the framers believed Africans 
were less than human, non-human, they were nothing more than objects 
to be owned and sold. As “ordinary articles of merchandise,” Taney 
argued that the framers thought of Africans “as beings of an inferior order, 
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations. . . .”44 They believed that Africans were so inferior that 
they could and should “justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his 
benefit.”45 
For Taney, excluding persons of African descent from the American 
political community was justified, not necessarily because he himself 
believed that African Americans were objectively inferior, but, because 
he believed that the framers thought that Africans were inferior and less 
than human. In other words, even if Taney thought, as an objective matter, 
Africans were not inferior by nature, as long as the framers viewed and 
treated them as inferior, i.e., as long as the framers dehumanized them, 
then that was a sufficient basis to deny Africans U.S. citizenship. 
Essentially, Taney honored and bestowed respect upon the framers’ 
dehumanization of African slaves instead of condemning it. 
Although Taney did not use the word dehumanization to describe 
how the framers viewed and treated African slaves and their descendants, 
that is the word which best fits their view. Taney noted that the framers 
“stigmatized” (dehumanized) Africans as an inferior, subordinate class of 
people unfit to be U.S. citizens.46 
In another part of his opinion, Taney argued that the existence of 
anti-miscegenation laws in the colonies and states in the eighteenth 
century was further proof that the framers universally viewed persons of 
African descent as less than human and unfit to be U.S. citizens.47 Taney 
referred to anti-miscegenation laws in non-slave colonies and states to 
show that even those who opposed slavery still believed in the inferior, 
subhuman nature of Africans who were unfit to marry whites, and 
consequently, unfit to be U.S. citizens.48 
The Court referred to a 1705 Massachusetts anti-miscegenation law 




46. Id. at 416. 
47. See id. at 408–09. 
48. See id. at 408–09, 413. 
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“degraded” and “unhappy” subordinate race.49 For the Court, the fact that 
free states enacted anti-miscegenation laws is convincing proof that a 
“perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the 
white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed 
as subjects with absolute and despotic power. . . .”50 The framers “looked 
upon” Africans “as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that 
intermarriages between white persons and negroes and mulattoes were 
regarded as unnatural and immoral. . . .”51 These anti-miscegenation laws 
banned all marriages between whites and persons of African descent, 
whether free or a slave, showing that the “stigma” of subordinate, inferior 
status “was fixed upon the whole race,” not just among slaves.52 
Taney’s logic is straightforward: If Africans were so degraded and 
inferior to whites that the framers prohibited and criminalized their 
marriage to whites, why would the framers grant formal citizenship to 
such a degraded and inferior class of people?53 In other words, the fact 
that the framers denied Blacks a key right associated with social 
citizenship, the right to marry, was conclusive proof for Taney that they 
meant to deny them formal citizenship in perpetuity. And dehumanization 
was central to denying Blacks the right to marry whites. 
B. Plessy v. Ferguson 
In 1868, through the Citizenship Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment 
effectively overruled Dred Scott and ensured U.S. citizenship to African 
Americans born in the United States. However, while African Americans 
obtained formal citizenship, they were quickly relegated to being second-
class citizens, first through Black Codes, then through systematic, state 
sanctioned racial segregation. 
Decided in 1896, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the 
constitutionality of racial segregation in public places and spaces.54 At 
issue was a Louisiana law requiring the separation of the races on 
passenger trains.55 The plaintiff challenged the law as a violation of equal 
protection. The Court held that there was no equal protection violation, 
even though the statute facially discriminated on the basis of race. 
49. Id. at 408–09. 




54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
55. Id. at 540. 
166 CONLAWNOW [12:157 
In upholding racial segregation, the Court had to somehow conclude 
that it did not offend the guarantees of citizenship, equality, and liberty to 
African Americans under the Fourteenth Amendment. If Blacks could not 
be excluded from a jury as the Court held in West Virginia v. Strauder56 a 
few decades before Plessy, how could the Court then conclude that Blacks 
could be excluded from public spaces and places on the basis of their race? 
The Court relied on the distinction between political, civil, and social 
equality (citizenship) to do so. While acknowledging that the purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause was to “enforce the absolute equality of the 
two races before the law,” the Court emphasized that it was not intended 
to “enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to each other.”57 
In other words, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed African Americans the rights associated with civil and 
political citizenship, but it did not provide them the rights associated with 
social citizenship. Why not? The Court, like the Dred Scott Court, resorted 
to dehumanizing African Americans to deny them social citizenship. It 
relied on its belief in the inherent inferiority of African Americans to 
conclude that they had no right to associate with whites in social spaces 
as their equals: “If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one 
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior 
to the other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them 
on the same plane.”58 
The Plessy decision paved the way for the systematic segregation 
and subordination of Blacks in Jim Crow South, segregation that imposed 
on Blacks second-class citizenship status. While Blacks were also denied 
political rights during Jim Crow, the central feature of Jim Crow was the 
dehumanizing treatment of Blacks as social inferiors unfit to associate 
with whites as equals. 
Thus, for the Plessy Court, while the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided African Americans the rights associated with civil and political 
citizenship, it did not require Blacks to be treated as fully human and 
thereby entitled to the rights associated with social citizenship. Restricting 
social citizenship was a way to deny as many of the aspects of citizenship 
as possible to African Americans while conceding those aspects it could 
not find a way to deny as a constitutional matter. 
56. 103 U.S. 303 (1880). 
57. Id. at 544. 
58. Id. at 551–52.
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Plessy ensured official second-class citizenship status for African 
Americans for the first half of the twentieth century until the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, when the Court struck 
down racial segregation of public schools.59 
C. Naim v. Naim 
In the aftermath of Brown, one of the central questions of racial 
equality left was the constitutionality of laws banning interracial marriage. 
In Naim v. Naim,60 the Virginia Supreme Court in 1955 upheld the Racial 
Integrity Act, the state’s anti-miscegenation statute. It did so by 
dehumanizing people of color, in particular, mixed-race people of color, 
and contending that the state was justified in banning interracial marriages 
because they threatened and undermined good citizenship. 
In Naim, a white wife of a Chinese husband sought to annul their 
marriage. The couple were residents of Virginia who had gone to North 
Carolina to get married and then returned to Virginia to live together as 
husband and wife.61 The trial court issued a decree declaring the marriage 
void because it was an interracial marriage in violation of Virginia’s ban 
of interracial marriages. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.62 
The court’s analysis focused on two themes. The first theme was the 
traditional authority of states to regulate marriage as part of their police 
power: “The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, 
and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is 
of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states 
suffer or permit any interference with.”63 
The second theme was citizenship. The court reasoned that the state 
had a legitimate interest in prohibiting interracial marriages in order to 
promote good citizenship. Interracial marriage could be prohibited 
because “no sort of valid reasoning could it be found to be a foundation 
of good citizenship. . . .”64 Going even further, the court reasoned that it 
believed interracial marriages are actually “harmful to good 
citizenship.”65 
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
60. 197 Va. 80 (1955). 
61. Id. at 81. 
62. Id. at 89–90. 
63. Id. at 84 (quoting State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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It may not seem intuitively clear what marriage has to do with good 
citizenship, let alone interracial marriage. It is only when we consider the 
court’s explicit dehumanization of racial minorities that the connection 
starts to make sense, at least from the perspective of segregationists. 
One reason that the court used the theme of citizenship to uphold the 
ban on interracial marriage is due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 
decision, Brown v. Board of Education, handed down in 1954.66 In that 
case, the Court struck down racial segregation in public schools as a 
violation of equal protection. The Naim decision followed one year later, 
and the central question was, could bans on interracial marriage survive 
Brown? 
The Naim court addressed Brown head on and distinguished it. The 
court seized on the language in Brown about good citizenship.67 The 
Brown Court reasoned that, because a sound education is so important to 
good citizenship, it must be provided on an equal basis.68 For the Naim 
court the central holding of Brown was that racial segregation was 
detrimental to good citizenship, while racial integration was necessary to 
ensure that Black children grew up to be good citizens. The Naim court 
then argued that Brown supports the ban on interracial marriages, because 
interracial marriages actually undermine good citizenship. 
For the Naim court, how exactly did interracial marriages 
undermined good citizenship? The key to understanding the Naim court’s 
rationale is the notion of racial purity or integrity, and the fear of mixed-
race children. For the Naim court, it was a patently legitimate state interest 
to “preserve the racial integrity of its citizens.”69 What did that mean? 
Preserving racial integrity, specifically, preserving white racial integrity, 
meant ensuring that whites remained whites over time. That required the 
state to prevent the “corruption of blood,” which was a metaphor both for 
sex between a white and non-white person, and the results of such sexual 
intercourse: the production of a child with corrupted blood; i.e., a child 
with superior white blood “mixed” with inferior non-white blood. 
The corruption of blood, if it were allowed to occur, would “weaken 
or destroy the quality of its citizens,” resulting in a “mongrel breed of 
citizens.”70 And, for the Naim court, the proliferation of mongrel citizens 
would spell disaster for Virginia and its goal of promoting good 
citizenship. 
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
67. Id. at 493. 
68. Id. 
69. Naim, 197 Va. at 90. 
70. Id. 
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Mongrel citizens, or mixed-race persons, were a danger to “good 
citizenship” because the court and segregationists believed that mixed 
race people were a race of people degraded and inferior to pure whites. If 
interracial marriages were permitted or encouraged, they would lead to 
the production of “mongrel” children. Over time, as more and more whites 
and non-whites entered into interracial marriages, mongrels would soon 
become the majority or dominant racial group. And a state or even nation 
dominated by inferior, inept, and incompetent mongrel citizens is a state 
or nation that would be in perpetual decline. 
The belief that mongrel citizens would harm or destroy good 
citizenship was based on the dehumanization of Blacks and mixed-race 
people as inferior, less than human creatures compared to pure white 
citizens. Dehumanization was central to denying non-whites the right to 
marry, a right central to social citizenship. And in denying Blacks full 
social citizenship, the state of Virginia and other segregationist states were 
continuing to impose second-class citizenship status on Blacks and other 
racial minorities. 
The Supreme Court finally ruled that bans on interracial marriages 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment in Loving v. Virginia.71 We can and 
should understand Loving to be a case about race and citizenship, not just 
about race and interpersonal relationships. It stands for the proposition 
that the right to marry anyone of one’s choice is an integral right of social 
citizenship specifically, and a right of full citizenship more broadly. In 
rejecting Virginia’s interest in preventing the production of “mongrel 
citizens,” the Loving Court emphatically rejected racial dehumanization 
as a means of imposing second-class citizenship on people of color.72 
IV. CONCLUSION: BLACK CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
What are some of the lessons that we can draw from my analysis for
what full citizenship for African Americans might mean today?  
One key lesson is that dehumanization has been a central feature of 
the subordination and denial of full citizenship to African Americans 
throughout American history. Slavery was dehumanization. Jim Crow 
segregation was dehumanization. The ban on interracial marriage was 
dehumanization. To state that African Americans have experienced racial 
discrimination over the centuries, without explicitly linking 
dehumanization to that discrimination, fails to highlight how truly 
71. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
72. See id. at 11–12. 
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pernicious and insidious that discrimination was. Dehumanization went 
hand in hand with differential treatment. 
A second lesson is that dehumanization, throughout American 
history, from Dred Scott to Naim, has been considered a valid justification 
for racial discrimination and subordination. Instead of being condemned 
as morally wrong, the defenders of white supremacy believed that the 
dehumanization of African Americans was completely unproblematic and 
justifiable. While one may understand how in 1857, the Supreme Court 
could honor and respect how the framers dehumanized Blacks, it may 
seem incredible that even in 1967, states like Virginia openly and 
unabashedly dehumanized Blacks and mixed-race persons. The 
normalization of dehumanization in American history must be 
acknowledged and understood if we are to fully grapple with the legacy 
of systemic racism in America. 
A third and perhaps most sobering lesson is that dehumanization is 
still a central part of the racial discrimination that African Americans and 
other racial groups experience today. When we look for it, we can see 
dehumanization virtually everywhere. De facto racial segregation in 
public schools and housing; the continuing stigma associated with 
interracial marriages between whites and Blacks; the experience with 
racist policing; the mass incarceration of Blacks and Latinos; these are all 
the elements of continuing second-class citizenship and systematic 
dehumanization of Blacks. Given that dehumanization has been 
normalized throughout American history, it really should not be surprising 
that racial dehumanization is still pervasive in America. Dehumanization 
is an integral aspect of current systemic racism. 
Finally, the hopeful lesson is that dehumanization does not have to 
be inevitable. Dehumanization can be countered through rehumanization. 
Rehumanization means treating dehumanized people with respect and 
dignity. In practice, that means actively entering into and maintaining 
relationships with persons of all races that involve mutual respect.  
Racial diversity and inclusion programs are fundamentally about 
racial rehumanization. They are about the inclusion of Blacks in various 
arenas of civil, political, and interpersonal society out of the belief that 
they are social equals deserving of mutual respect and equality. The 
diversity and inclusion movement seeks to encourage and facilitate 
recognition of diverse racial identities. To that end, we can think of 
diversity as fundamentally about granting full citizenship for African 
Americans. 
